Psychiatrization, assertions of epistemic justice, and the question of agency.

Thus far, the concept of epistemic injustice in the context of psychiatry has been discussed more widely by clinical academics than by authors with personal experience of psychiatrization. It is from the latter perspective that I critique the practice of attributing testimonial injustice solely to the "stigma against mental illness", and point to psychiatric diagnosing itself as a principal enabler and re-producer of this form of injustice. In relation to hermeneutical justice, I take a closer look at initiatives seeking to incorporate (collective) first-person knowledge into the epistemic systems that currently dominate mental-health service provision and research. Highlighting the incompatibility of psychiatric knowledge claims with first-person ways of knowing, I discuss some of the issues and challenges involved in achieving epistemic justice for psychiatrized people and advancing our collective knowledge base. Finally, I turn to the questions of identity and agency in these processes.

The Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: More Than Just Another Reform of Psychiatry.

The social model of disability-which is grounded in the lived realities of disabled people, as well as their activism, research, and theoretical work-has enabled a historic turn in the understanding of disability. This model also facilitates the transition to the rights-based approach that is at the core of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). However, the social model of disability does not straightforwardly translate to the lives of people who end up being detained and forcibly treated in psychiatric facilities. This paper examines the implications of the lack of an equivalent theoretical framework to counteract the hegemony of the biomedical model of "mental illness" and to underpin and guide the implementation of the CRPD for people with psychiatric diagnoses. Critically engaging with some recent attempts to make the CRPD provisions integral to psychiatry, we expose fundamental contradictions inherent in such projects. Our discussion seeks to extend the task of implementation of the CRPD beyond reforming psychiatry, suggesting a much broader agenda for change. We argue for the indispensability of first-person knowledge in developing and owning this agenda and point to the dangers of merely remaking former treatment objects into objects of human rights.

Taking part in a pharmacogenetic clinical trial: assessment of trial participants understanding of information disclosed during the informed consent process.

BACKGROUND: This study is the first to examine the understandings that participants have of the consent process in a pharmacogenetic trial of anti-depressant medication. METHODS: This was a qualitative cross sectional study. There were 76 participants residing in London, Mannheim, Arhuus and Poznan. RESULTS: Only one quarter of participants (none in Poznan) could articulate the concept of pharmacogenetics. Heritability and testing medication were also given as the purpose of the trial. Most participants had not appreciated harms that could derive from the trial. Even when shown the consent sheet, participants were confused about DNA profiling. There was evidence that participants appreciated weekly contact with researchers. Most said they would participate in a trial again but would like choice over the intervention they were assigned to. CONCLUSION: Participants in this study showed a poor level of informed consent. Although this is not the first time this argument has been made, it is in the case of a pharmacogenetic trial. Further work should investigate the associations between extraneous factors such as information and social support on beneficial or untoward outcomes of antidepressant treatment.